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I. INTRODUCTION 
The initial three-step test in international copyright law was developed at 
the 1967 Stockholm Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention. 
 
  © 2014 Martin Senftleben. 
 †  Ph.D.; Professor of Intellectual Property, VU University Amsterdam; Senior 
Consultant, Bird & Bird, The Hague. 
 2 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:1 
COMMENTARIES 
The three-step test regulates the adoption of copyright limitations and 
exceptions at the national level. It permits the introduction of use privileges 
in (1) certain special cases that (2) do not conflict with a work’s normal 
exploitation and (3) do not unreasonably prejudice legitimate interests of 
authors and right holders.1 
Given the present need for new limitations and exceptions—for instance, 
in the area of search engine services,2 user-generated content,3 cloud 
 
 1. In treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”), the three-step test refers to the interests of authors. Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act art. 9(2), July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 
828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 10, Dec. 20, 
1996, 36 L.L.M. 65. Article 13 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”), by contrast, addresses the interests of the right holder. TRIPS 
constitutes Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 L.L.M. 1197. 
 2. While U.S. courts seem capable of dealing with copyright issues raised by search 
engines on the basis of the U.S. fair use doctrine, courts in the European Union have 
difficulty inventing around the overly restrictive E.U. system of copyright limitations and 
exceptions that is often found not to offer the use privileges necessary to strike a proper 
balance between copyright protection and freedom of information. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1163–68 (9th Cir. 2007) (pointing out that “the significantly 
transformative nature of Google’s search engine, particularly in light of its public benefit, 
outweighs Google’s superseding and commercial uses of the thumbnails in this case. In 
reaching this conclusion, we note the importance of analyzing fair use flexibly in light of new 
circumstances”), with Martin Senftleben, Internet Search Results – A Permissible Quotation?, 235 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, at 85–89 (2013) (explaining that apart 
from a broadened application of the quotation right in the Netherlands, breathing space for 
search engine services could only be created in several national copyright systems in the 
European Union outside the copyright limitations system on the basis of doubtful 
assumptions related to E.U. safe harbor provisions, national implied consent theories, or the 
assumption of an abuse of rights); Lucie Guibault, Why Cherry-Picking Never Leads to 
Harmonisation, 1 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & E-COM. L. 55, at 56–57 (2010) (underlining 
that in contrast to flexible fair use systems, the closed list of copyright exceptions in 
European Union copyright law is incapable of keeping pace with technological 
developments and dynamically developing markets); Martin Senftleben, Bridging the Differences 
Between Copyright's Legal Traditions – The Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 521, 528–29 (2010) (pointing out that the present regulation of copyright exceptions 
in the European Union is a “worst case scenario” in the sense that it “provides neither 
sufficient flexibility for copyright limitations nor sufficient legal certainty for users of 
copyrighted material”); see also Matthias Leistner, The German Federal Supreme Court’s Judgment 
on Google’s Image Search – A Topical Example of the “Limitations” of the European Approach to 
Exceptions and Limitations, 42 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 417, 440–42 
(2011) (concluding, on the one hand, that the insufficient flexibility of the present system of 
copyright exceptions in the European Union results in inconsistent “makeshift solutions” 
invented by the courts, but, on the other hand, the introduction of a broad, U.S.-style fair 
use blanket clause would go too far). 
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computing,4 and data mining5—it is important to clarify the room available 
under the three-step test. An overly restrictive approach, such as the 
interpretation developed in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) panel 
decision on Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,6 can easily become an 
 
 3. See Copyright Act art. 29.21, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, amended by Copyright 
Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 (Can.) (discussing an exceptional case of a specific use 
privilege for user-generated content). As to the general debate on user-generated content and 
the need for copyright limitations in this area, see generally Tom W. Bell, The Specter of 
Copyism v. Blockheaded Authors: How User-Generated Content Affects Copyright Policy, 10 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 841 (2008); Branwen Buckley, SueTube: Web 2.0 and Copyright Infringement, 31 
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 235 (2008); Steven Hechter, User-Generated Content and the Future of 
Copyright: Part One – Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L., 863 (2008); Steven 
D. Jamar, Crafting Copyright Law to Encourage and Protect User-Generated Content in the Internet 
Social Networking Context, 19 WIDENER L. J. 843 (2010); Greg Lastowka, User-Generated Content 
and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 893 (2008); Edward Lee, Warming up to User-
Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459 (2008); Mary W.S. Wong, Transformative User-
Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 1075 (2009); Natalie Helberger et al., Institute for Information Law (IViR), Legal 
Aspects of User Created Content (2009), http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1499333.  
 4. For an overview of the debate over exemptions for cloud computing services, see 
Martin Senftleben, Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models—Exploring the Matrix of 
Copyright Limitations, Safe Harbours and Injunctions, 4 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & E-COM. 
L. 874 (2013). With regard to definitions of cloud computing, see supra note 1.  
 5. New copyright limitations and exceptions for purposes of data mining have been 
discussed in jurisdictions such as the U.K. For information about the different positions 
taken in the debate, see HM Government, Consultation on Copyright: Summary of 
Responses June 2012 17–18 (June 2012) (discussing different public opinions about a 
copyright exemption for the use of text and data mining for research), 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/copyright-summaryofresponses-pdf. In light of the responses, the 
U.K. government has proposed to: 
[A]mend the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 so that it is not an 
infringement of copyright for a person who already has a right to access a 
work (whether under a license or otherwise) to copy the work as part of a 
technological process of analysis and synthesis of the content of the work 
for the sole purpose of non-commercial research. 
See HM Government, Modernizing Copyright: A Modern, Robust and Flexible Framework 
37 (Dec. 2012), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/response-2011-copyright-final.pdf. The text of the 
proposed new exception is available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/techreview-data-analysis.pdf. 
 6. On the basis of a meticulous interpretation of each element of the three-step test, 
the WTO panel stated that section 110(5)(B) of the U.S. Copyright Act, which exempts 
certain bars and restaurants that broadcast non-dramatic musical works from copyright 
royalty payments, violated all three steps of Article 13 TRIPS. See Panel Report, United States 
—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), available at 
docs.wto.org [hereinafter Panel Report]. For comments, see generally Martin Senftleben, 
Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights?: WTO Panel Reports Shed 
Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark Law, 37 
INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 407 (2006); Mihály Ficsor, How Much of 
What? The Three-Step Test and Its Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement Cases Section 
VI, 192 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 111 (2002); Jo Oliver, Copyright in 
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obstacle to ongoing innovation in the creation and dissemination of 
copyrighted works. It will deprive national lawmakers of the breathing space 
necessary to reconcile copyright protection with freedom of expression and 
competition.  
Against this background, this Article discusses the potential role of 
embargo periods and opt-out formalities in the enhancement of flexibility 
under the international three-step test. The traditional focus on the payment 
of equitable remuneration as a flexibility tool will be explained in Part II 
before discussing the problem that remuneration is not considered under the 
normal exploitation analysis in Part III. Given this weakness of the 
traditional approach, Part IV will explain how embargo periods and opt-out 
formalities can serve as important alternative mechanisms to avoid conflicts 
with normal exploitation. Furthermore, the combination of both mechanisms 
may even allow national policymakers to phase out exclusive rights and 
replace them with remuneration rights.  
II. THE TRADITIONAL FOCUS ON EQUITABLE 
REMUNERATION AS A FLEXIBILITY TOOL UNDER 
THE THREE-STEP TEST 
The first three-step test in international copyright law constituted a 
counterbalance to the formal recognition of a broad, general right of 
reproduction in Article 9(1) BC.7 According to Article 9(2) BC, national 
legislation is free to permit the reproduction of protected works “in certain 
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author.” This three-step test was understood to 
 
the WTO: The Panel Decision on the Three-Step Test, 25 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 119 (2002); David J. 
Brennan, The Three-Step Test Frenzy: Why the TRIPS Panel Decision Might be Considered Per 
Incuriam, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 213 (2002); Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright 
Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, 190 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 13 (2001). 
 7. Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(1). For a more detailed description of the 
drafting history, see Daniel Gervais, Fair Use, Fair Dealing, Fair Principles: Efforts to Conceptualize 
Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 499, 510–11 (2010); 
Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water—How Much Room for Exceptions and 
Limitations Under the Three-Step Test?, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 287, 307–08 (2009); SAM 
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING 
RIGHTS – THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 759–63 (2d ed. 2006); MARTIN 
SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW 47–52 (2004) 
(explaining that formal recognition of a general right of reproduction in the 1967 Stockholm 
Conference depended on finding a satisfactory formula for permissible limitations). 
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offer national policymakers sufficient room for exemptions from the right of 
reproduction that are necessary to satisfy social, cultural, and economic 
needs.8  
In the deliberations at the Diplomatic Conference, the payment of 
equitable remuneration was recognized as an important factor in the three-
step test analysis. The report on the work of Main Committee I—the 
Committee dealing with the right of reproduction—gave the following 
example of the test’s function:  
A practical example might be photocopying for various purposes. 
If it consists of producing a very large number of copies, it may not 
be permitted, as it conflicts with a normal exploitation of the work. 
If it implies a rather large number of copies for use in industrial 
undertakings, it may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author, provided that, according to national 
legislation, an equitable remuneration is paid. If a small number of 
copies is made, photocopying may be permitted without payment, 
particularly for individual or scientific use.9  
Hence, the Committee regarded the payment of equitable remuneration as a 
factor capable of tipping the scales in favor of finding compliance. An 
unreasonable prejudice against the author’s interests arising from the 
exemption of “a rather large number of copies for use in industrial 
undertakings” can be reduced to a permissible reasonable level by paying 
equitable remuneration.10  
This Berne standard also made its way into the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), in which the test’s 
ambit of operation was substantially broadened. With Article 13 TRIPS, the 
three-step test became a general yardstick for the permissibility of copyright 
exemptions. The provision covers limitations and exceptions to the 
economic rights newly granted under TRIPS as well as those recognized in 
the Berne Convention.11 
The three-step test also played a decisive role during the negotiations of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) “Internet” Treaties. In 
Article 10(1) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), the three-step test 
paved the way for an agreement on the limitations and exceptions to the new 
 
 8. See WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm June 11 to July 14, 
1967, at 81 (1971) [hereinafter WIPO Conference of Stockholm 1967]. 
 9. Id. at 1145–46.  
 10. Id.  
 11. For a description of the functioning of Article 13 TRIPS, see DANIEL GERVAIS, 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 237–43 (3rd ed. 2008); 
SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 83–90. 
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rights recognized in the Treaty, including the right of making works available 
on the Internet as part of the general right of communication to the public.12 
Article 10(2) WCT confirms the test’s applicability to exemptions from the 
exclusive rights granted in the Berne Convention.  
When considering the international three-step tests in Articles 9(2) BC, 
13 TRIPS and 10(1) and (2) WCT, it becomes obvious that the provision, by 
far, is the most important and comprehensive international basis for the 
development of national use privileges, including use privileges required in 
the digital environment. Against this background, it is important to note that 
the test’s fundamental role in enabling limitations and exceptions, and 
enhancing the flexibility of the copyright system has been underlined in the 
Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 WCT that was formally adopted at 
the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference: 
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit 
Contracting Parties to carry forward and appropriately extend into 
the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their national 
laws which have been considered acceptable under the Berne 
Convention. Similarly, these provisions should be understood to 
permit Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations 
that are appropriate in the digital network environment.13 
As explained above, the payment of equitable remuneration has been part 
of this permission to “carry forward and appropriately extend” limitations 
and exceptions from the very beginning.14 It extends the options available to 
 
 12. For the debate in the context of the WIPO “Internet” Treaties, see SENFTLEBEN, 
supra note 7, at 96–98; MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 
1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 515–19 (2002); 
JÖRG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996: COMMENTARY 
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 118–21 (2002). 
 13. Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 10 (Dec. 20, 
1996), http://www.wipo.int./treaties/en/ip/wct/statements.html.  
 14. Id. This is obvious in the case of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, which, according to 
its Article 1(1), is a special agreement within the meaning of Article 20 BC. It is thus 
consistent to read the three-step test in Article 10 WCT in the light of the drafting history 
underlying the first three-step test in international copyright law that was laid down in Article 
9(2) BC. With regard to Article 13 TRIPS, the issue has been clarified by the WTO panel 
dealing with Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act. The Panel Report, supra note 6, at 
para. 6.62, explicitly concluded that the inclusion of Berne provisions by virtue of Article 
9(1) BC included the Berne acquis: “If that incorporation should have covered only the text 
of Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention (1971), but not the entire Berne acquis relating to 
these articles, Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement would have explicitly so provided.” This 
conclusion can be understood to also cover the recognition of equitable remuneration as an 
additional balancing tool under the three-step test. The Panel itself, at para. 6.73, quotes the 
relevant passage from the report on the work of Main Committee 1 of the 1967 Stockholm 
Conference. 
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national policymakers. Instead of a mere black-and-white decision between 
the permission or prohibition of a use privilege, shades of grey can be added 
by mitigating the corrosive effect of a broad use privilege through the 
payment of equitable remuneration: an otherwise unacceptable exemption 
becomes compliant with the three-step test because of the remuneration.  
III. NORMAL EXPLOITATION OBSTACLE TO A FLEXIBLE 
THREE-STEP TEST 
The effectiveness of equitable remuneration as an additional flexibility 
tool for national lawmaking, however, is overshadowed by the architecture of 
the three-step test. Traditionally, the three steps of the test—certain special 
cases (step 1), no conflict with a normal exploitation (step 2), and no 
unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests (step 3)—are applied 
cumulatively: a national use privilege must pass all three steps to be 
adopted.15 Moreover, the test procedure is traditionally seen as a step-by-step 
exercise: a national use privilege must pass one step after another.16 If the use 
privilege cannot be qualified as a certain special case, or if it conflicts with a 
normal exploitation, the analysis ends: the use privilege is declared 
impermissible regardless of whether it also causes an unreasonable prejudice 
to legitimate interests. Considering the above-cited practical example 
concerning photocopying for various purposes that was given at the 1967 
Stockholm Conference,17 an appropriate remuneration scheme is capable of 
reducing an unreasonable prejudice to a permissible reasonable level. 
However, it does not make a use privilege a certain special case, nor does it 
resolve a conflict with a normal exploitation. 
Hence, a strict application of the certain special cases test and the normal 
exploitation test will inevitably erode the flexibility available under the final 
unreasonable prejudice test. It follows from the wording of this final test 
(“. . . and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author”) that not every interest of authors and right holders becomes 
relevant. Only legitimate interests are to be factored into the equation.18 
Furthermore, not every prejudice to legitimate interests is relevant. Only 
unreasonable prejudices are unacceptable.19 The third step, therefore, offers 
 
 15. See REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 12, at 124. 
 16. For a more detailed discussion of these features and the resulting test procedure, 
see SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 125–33. 
 17. See WIPO Conference of Stockholm 1967, supra note 8. 
 18. Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 6.222, at 57.  
 19. Id. para. 6.229, at 59 (noting that “a certain amount of ‘prejudice’ has to be 
presumed justified as ‘not unreasonable’ ”). 
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several filters that transform it into a refined proportionality test: the 
legitimacy of the interests invoked by authors and right holders are to be 
weighed against the reasons justifying the use privilege. The payment of 
equitable remuneration allows refined solutions in this context.20 
This panoply of balancing tools—the legitimacy filter, the 
unreasonableness filter, and the remuneration option—is indispensable in the 
digital environment. If copyright limitations and exceptions are to be carried 
forward and appropriately extended into the digital environment, as 
enunciated in the Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 WCT, more is 
needed than a verdict of noncompliance based on a finding that the use 
privilege does not constitute a certain special case or conflicts with a normal 
exploitation. The rationales of copyright protection must be weighed against 
the justifications for an exemption. In many cases, this weighing process 
involves fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular freedom of speech, 
the protection of privacy, and freedom of competition.21 While the third step 
of the three-step test offers sufficient flexibility for this balancing exercise, 
the first and second steps constitute risk factors. Through misinterpretations, 
steps one and two may become straitjackets preventing national policymakers 
from developing balanced solutions that leave sufficient room for freedom of 
expression and freedom of competition. 
The WTO panel decision on Article 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act 
enhanced this risk of diminished flexibility in the application of the three-
step test. The panel held that for a national use privilege to constitute a 
certain special case, it should be narrow in a quantitative, as well as a 
qualitative, sense.22 To avoid a conflict with a work’s normal exploitation, it 
must not encroach upon forms of exploitation that currently generate 
“significant or tangible revenue” or could acquire “considerable economic or 
practical importance” in the future.23 Under this interpretation, the first two 
steps become minefields for national policymakers seeking to ensure 
compliance with the three-step test. This is particularly true with regard to 
the normal exploitation test. If understood broadly, the criterion of potential 
 
 20. See WIPO Conference of Stockholm 1967, supra note 8, at 1145–46.  
 21. For an analysis of the impact of fundamental rights on copyright limitations and 
exceptions, see Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of 
Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 IIC: INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 371 (2006); P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of 
Expression in Europe, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 239 (Niva Elkin-Koren 
& Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996). 
 22. Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 6.109–.112, at 33–34. 
 23. Id. para. 6.180, at 48. 
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markets of “considerable economic or practical importance” may cover all 
forms of using copyrighted works on the Internet. Arguably, technological 
protection measures and digital rights management offer unprecedented 
opportunities for establishing new digital markets.24 
Not surprisingly, the WTO panel decision triggered several proposals for 
a more balanced interpretation. The criterion of “considerable economic or 
practical importance” could be understood to cover only the economic core 
of copyright, specifically those modes of exploitation that typically constitute 
a major source of income.25 Instead of focusing on a market analysis, the 
normative question could prevail: whether it is justifiable from a public-
policy perspective to give the copyright owner control over a given form of 
exploitation.26 The traditional step-by-step analysis could be abandoned in 
favor of a global balancing exercise in which the individual steps constitute 
mere factors to be weighed against each other. The three-step test could also 
be read in reverse, starting with the flexible unreasonable prejudice test. The 
normal exploitation analysis would then only function as a safeguard against 
the abuse of overbroad use privileges.27 Synthesizing these approaches, the 
Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step Test sees the different tests 
as an indivisible entirety requiring a comprehensive overall assessment.28 The 
 
 24. This risk of diminishing flexibility has also been pointed out by Jonathan Griffiths, 
The “Three-Step Test” in European Copyright Law: Problems and Solutions, 9 INTELL. PROP. Q. 428, 
at 441 (2009); see also Daniel Gervais, Making Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach to Copyright 
Exceptions and Limitations, 5 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 30 (2008); Christophe Geiger, The 
Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?, 37 IIC: INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 683 (2006); see Thomas Heide, The Berne Three-Step Test and the Proposed 
Copyright Directive, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 105, 106 (1999). 
 25. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 184–94. 
 26. Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 23, sees room for the inclusion of normative 
considerations: “. . . if the exploitation falls within the scope of copyright, and no copyright 
or related cultural policies undergird the right holder’s disability from exercising the right, 
then the exploitation may, as a normative matter, be ‘normal.’” See also the comments in 
favor of the inclusion of normative considerations by Oliver, supra note 6, at 158; Gervais, 
supra note 24, at 30. 
 27. See Christophe Geiger, Right to Copy v. Three-Step Test, 6 COMPUTER L. REV. INT’L 7, 
12 (2005).  
 28. See Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step 
Test” in Copyright Law, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 711 (2008). The 
Declaration is the result of a joint project organized by the Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Munich, and Queen Mary, University of 
London. They brought together a group of experts who jointly drafted the Declaration 
aiming at securing a balanced interpretation of the three-step test in copyright law. See also 
Reto M. Hilty, Declaration on the Three-Step Test–Where do we go from here?, 1 J. INTELL. PROP., 
INFO. TECH. & E-COM. L. 83 (2010).  
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payment of equitable remuneration is regarded as a universal balancing tool 
that also impacts the decision on a conflict with a normal exploitation.29 
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FLEXIBILITY IN 
ADOPTING A USE PRIVILEGE 
Despite these flexible alternative approaches, exploring additional 
mechanisms is important for enhancing the policy space available under the 
three-step test. First, national policymakers may hesitate to follow a more 
flexible approach while WTO jurisprudence adheres to the traditional step-
by-step analysis.30 Second, policymakers may find that the equitable 
remuneration option does not fit well into their national copyright systems.31 
Against this background, embargo periods and opt-out formalities can 
constitute attractive supplements to the traditional reliance on the payment 
of equitable remuneration. 
A. EMBARGO PERIODS 
The basic idea underlying embargo periods on copyright limitations and 
exceptions is simple: a use privilege only becomes available after a certain 
period of time has passed since the work has first been made available to the 
public with the consent of the right holder. To ensure compliance with the 
three-step test, the embargo period should align with the normal exploitation 
test: the use privilege should become available only after the work’s normal 
exploitation has been completed. The drafting history underlying the three-
step test is silent on the inclusion of this dynamic element in copyright 
limitations and exceptions. Unlike equitable remuneration, embargo periods 
are not linked with the unreasonable prejudice test through a practical 
example given at the 1967 Stockholm Conference. Moreover, the WTO 
panel’s formula of exploitation forms that currently generate “significant or 
 
 29. See Geiger et al., supra note 28, at 710; see also Hilty, supra note 28, at 83.  
 30. Future WTO panels dealing with Article 13 TRIPS are not formally bound by the 
approach taken in the report on Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act. Adopted panel 
reports do not have a stare decisis effect in the sense that their findings cannot be overruled in 
the course of future dispute settlement procedures. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 19–22 (5th ed. 1998); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 127 (2000). Therefore, the panel report on Section 110(5) does not necessarily 
constitute established case law. Further panel reports are necessary to clarify which features 
of the actual interpretation are lasting. 
 31. For an overview of various national systems of copyright limitations and 
exceptions, see BALANCING COPYRIGHT – A SURVEY OF NATIONAL APPROACHES (Reto M. 
Hilty & Sylvie Nérisson eds., 2012). 
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tangible revenue”32 or could potentially acquire “considerable economic or 
practical importance”33 seems to leave room for the introduction of embargo 
periods. Arguably, the exploitation of many works only yields significant, 
tangible, or considerable income during an initial period of several months or 
years. Once this normal exploitation period expires, the room for copyright 
limitations and exceptions becomes broader. As a conflict with a normal 
exploitation need not be feared any longer, the use privilege need only 
comply with the much more flexible unreasonable prejudice test.34 
Embargo periods can be used in different areas. The E.U. Orphan Works 
Directive,35 for instance, allows Member States to exempt the making 
available and certain acts of reproduction of orphan works by publicly 
accessible libraries, educational establishments and museums, archives, film 
or audio heritage institutions, and public-service broadcasting organizations.36 
The use privilege only becomes available if the right holder cannot be found 
through a diligent search.37 This situation is unlikely to arise before the 
normal exploitation has been completed. As long as significant, tangible, or 
considerable income accrues from the work’s commercialization, it should 
not be difficult to find the right holder. The Orphan Works Directive also 
provides for the payment of “fair compensation” in case the right holder 
turns up and puts an end to the orphan work status.38 This can be seen as an 
additional safeguard against the remaining risk of an unreasonable prejudice 
to legitimate interests. 
The Orphan Works Directive is far from offering an ideal solution.39 Its 
search requirement, administrative burdens, and the legal uncertainty arising 
from the possible termination of orphan work status make it an unattractive 
or even unworkable model. However, this need not discredit embargo 
periods as a flexibility tool. If, instead of requiring a diligent search, the 
exemption of the making available of cultural heritage material became 
 
 32. Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 6.180, at 48. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Reto M. Hilty, “Lessons From Other Intellectual Property Regimes: 
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright for the Internet Age” at the Berkeley Symposium(Apr. 19, 2013), 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/15235.htm.  
 35. Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299)5 [hereinafter 
Orphan Works Directive]. 
 36. Id. art. 6(1), at 9–10. 
 37. Id. art. 3(1), at 9. 
 38. Id. art. 6(5), at 10. 
 39. For a discussion of alternative approaches, see Stef van Gompel, Unlocking the 
Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How to Address the Issue of Orphan Works in Europe?, 38 INT’L 
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 669 (2007). 
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generally available after an appropriate embargo period, mass digitization 
projects could be encouraged without encroaching upon a work’s normal 
exploitation.40 Embargo periods could also be used to exempt user-generated 
content from the control of copyright holders once a work’s normal 
exploitation has come to an end. 
B. OPT-OUT FORMALITIES 
Besides embargo periods, opt-out formalities can serve as a tool to avoid 
conflicts with normal exploitation. Again the underlying idea is simple: the 
right holder can render a use privilege inapplicable by reserving her rights. 
This, in turn, will prevent users from eroding a work’s normal exploitation. 
In international law, for example, the press privilege laid down in Article 
10bis(1) BC rests on this opt-out solution: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to 
permit the reproduction by the press, the broadcasting or the 
communication to the public by wire of articles published in 
newspapers or periodicals on current economic, political or 
religious topics, and of broadcast works of the same character, in 
cases in which the reproduction, broadcasting or such 
communication thereof is not expressly reserved.41 
The reservation of rights reflected in this provision entered the Berne 
Convention as an element of the debate on the protection of publications in 
newspapers and periodicals, and the freedom to use news information and 
newspaper articles with the exception of serial stories and tales.42 From the 
perspective of the three-step test, the option to reserve rights can be deemed 
necessary to avoid a conflict with the normal exploitation. The forms of 
exploitation covered by Article 10bis(1) BC—reproduction, broadcasting, 
and communication to the public—are central to the normal exploitation of 
press articles and broadcasts. Moreover, the exemption concerns the initial 
exploitation period. Article 10bis(1) BC applies to “current economic, 
political or religious topics.” Hence, it exempts the use of fresh articles with 
news value. As the right holder can opt out by reserving her rights, however, 
the risk of a conflict with the normal exploitation is minimized. 
 
 40. According to the Orphan Works Directive, supra note 35, at Recital 4, the Directive 
does not address mass digitization projects, which are left to individual solutions developed 
in E.U. Member States. 
 41. Article 10bis(1) BC supra note 1, at 9.  
 42. For the development of the provision in the Berne Convention, see RICKETSON & 
GINSBURG, supra note 7, at 796–800; Lucie Guibault, The Press Exception in the Dutch Copyright 
Act, in A CENTURY OF DUTCH COPYRIGHT LAW – AUTEURSWET 1912–2012 443, 447–50 
(P. Bernt Hugenholtz et al. eds., 2012). 
 2014] THE NORMAL EXPLOITATION OBSTACLE 13 
For national policymakers, opt-out formalities offer an instrument to 
experiment with relatively broad copyright limitations and exceptions. To 
ensure compliance with the three-step test, the potential adverse effect on a 
work’s normal exploitation can be minimized by giving right holders the 
opportunity to opt out. The use of this possibility in practice, then, will show 
whether right holders really see the exemption as a risk factor. The 
reservation of rights in Article 10bis(1) BC, for instance, evolved from 
industry practice more than a century ago.43 At the time, newspapers 
considered the reproduction of their articles in other newspapers as an 
advertisement and promotion of their activities.44 In particular, local 
newspapers with limited financial resources could hardly have satisfied the 
news demand of their readers without reproducing newspaper articles from 
bigger newspapers.45 
This historical background to Article 10bis(1) BC gives rise to the 
question whether the opt-out model can readily be extended to other 
situations where no such industry practice exists. Does the opt-out provision 
in Article 10bis(1) BC pass the normal exploitation test only because it had 
already become “normal” on the market for news to reproduce and 
disseminate articles from other newspapers that had not reserved their rights? 
Or can an opt-out model also be used as a means to avoid a conflict with a 
normal exploitation test in cases where no such pre-existing industry practice 
can be found? 
The better arguments support this latter assumption. The opt-out model 
in Article 10bis(1) BC can, as mentioned, be traced back to industry practices 
that originated in the news sector over a century ago.46 At the time of the 
introduction of the first international three-step test in the framework of the 
1967 Stockholm Conference, however, different practices had already 
evolved on the news market. In the preparatory documents of the 
Diplomatic Conference, it was even proposed to abolish the opt-out 
provision because of these changed practices.47 During the Conference, 
however, several delegations had success in defending the use privilege by 
 
 43. See LUCIE GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS—AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT 58 (2002) 
(discussing the rationales underlying the newspaper exemption). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Guibault, supra note 42, at 444–45 (stating that “[h]ardly any newspaper in those 
days could survive without citing or borrowing articles from prestigious foreign 
publications”).  
 46. See GUIBAULT, supra note 43, at 58.  
 47. WIPO Conference of Stockholm 1967, supra note 8, at 114. 
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arguing that it contributed substantially to the free flow of information.48 
When the three-step test was later implemented in Article 13 TRIPS and 
Article 10(2) WCT (and thus also became applicable to Article 10bis(1) BC), 
the compliance of the opt-out model with the normal exploitation test was 
not called into doubt. Hence it seems that during the TRIPS and WCT 
negotiations, the fact that the reproduction and dissemination of newspaper 
articles no longer constituted a well-established industry practice in the news 
sector was not regarded as an obstacle to compliance with the normal 
exploitation test. 
The reason for this can be seen in the possibility to render the use 
privilege inapplicable through the reservation of rights. When opting out, 
copyright owners put an end to unauthorized use on the basis of Article 
10bis(1) BC. Accordingly, they can regulate the impact on their exploitation 
strategy and safeguard the normal exploitation of their works themselves. 
This can also be assumed in cases where the market concerned has not yet 
developed corresponding industry practices.  
Nowadays, an opt-out solution could be adopted, for instance, in the area 
of search engine services. Far-reaching use privileges for search engine 
providers may be acceptable to right holders who see the Internet as an 
advertisement and promotion instrument for their works. For instance, the 
copyright issues arising from image search services could be solved by giving 
right holders the opportunity to opt out through the use of appropriate 
technical instructions for search robots.49 This solution may be of particular 
importance in countries without an open-ended fair-use clause that allows 
 
 48. See the description of the deliberations at the Conference by RICKETSON & 
GINSBURG, supra note 7, at 799. 
 49. On the basis of a theory of implied consent, this solution has been developed by 
the German Supreme Court. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 
29, 2010, I ZR 69/08 ¶ 29, available at http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/recht 
sprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=2010-4&nr=51998&pos=16&anz= 
298; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 19, 2011, I ZR 140/10 ¶ 18, 
available at http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht= 
bgh&Art=en&Datum=2011-10&Seite=4&nr=59857&pos=134&anz=292. For commentary, 
 see Thomas Dreier, Thumbnails als Zitate?—Zur Reichweite von § 51 UrhG in der 
Informationsgesellschaft, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ACHIM KRÄMER, 225 (Uwe Blaurock et al. eds., 
2009); Matthias Berberich, Die urheberrechtliche Zulässigkeit von Thumbnails bei der Suche nach 
Bildern im Internet, 8 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 145 (2005); Ansgar Ohly, Zwölf Thesen zur 
Einwilligung im Internet, 114 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 983 
(2012); Dr. Matthias Leistner & Felix Stang, Die Bildersuche im Internet aus urheberrechtlicher Sicht, 
24 COMPUTER UND RECHT 499 (2008); Stephan Ott, Zulässigkeit der Erstellung von Thumbnails 
durch Bilder- und Nachrichtensuchmaschinen?, 119 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND 
MEDIENRECHT 119 (2007). 
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the courts to adapt the system of limitations and exceptions to new 
information services and needs.50  
Opt-out formalities may also create additional breathing space for the 
exemption of user-generated content.51 Right holders who see amateur 
performances and remixes as promotion activities for the original work will 
refrain from reserving their rights. Others who see amateur creations as an 
encroachment upon their copyright remain free to opt out. The market will 
determine which approach generates higher revenue for a work, and thus, 
determine the approach that is preferred in the long run. Today’s Internet 
users are likely to prefer works that can later be adapted and discussed on 
platforms for user-generated content.52 Hence, right holders may prefer not 
to reserve these rights. 
A final question concerns the prohibition of formalities in Article 5(2) 
BC, according to which “the enjoyment and the exercise” of copyright shall 
not be subject to any formality. Does this provision militate against the use 
of opt-out formalities in the area of limitations and exceptions? As Stef van 
Gompel has shown, the answer need not be in the affirmative.53 He argues 
that while Article 5(2) prohibits formal requirements as to the coming into 
being and the enforcement of copyright (external conditions), the prohibition 
leaves room for formalities with regard to the extent, quality, and contents of 
protection (internal conditions).54 Certain aspects of protection may thus be 
made subject to formal requirements. For instance, a country may combine 
the adoption of a use privilege with an opt-out formality for right holders if it 
is free under the three-step test to adopt the same use privilege even without 
 
 50. For a comparative analysis of problems that have arisen in Germany, France and 
Spain because of the absence of a sufficiently flexible system of copyright limitations and 
exceptions, see generally Senftleben, Internet Search Results, supra note 2; Leistner, supra note 2.  
 51. As to the need for broader copyright limitations and exceptions in this area, see 
Jamar, supra note 3, at 870–72 (arguing that an “explicit, relatively bright-line rule” exempting 
use for the purpose of creating user-generated content “would remove much uncertainty 
associated with reliance on fair use and concomitantly reduce transaction costs associated 
with a permission-based system”); Wong, supra note 3, at 1108–09 (arguing for a more 
complete understanding of “transformativeness” in the context of both the fair use doctrine 
and the right of adaptation. This broader understanding would not only focus on the 
purpose and extent of the use made by the creator of user-generated content but also on the 
result of the user’s additions and changes in the sense of evaluating whether new meaning, 
information, or expression has been added to the original work).  
 52. See Sacha Wunsch-Vincent & Graham Vickery, Participative Web: User-Created 
Content, OECD, Apr. 12, 2007, available at http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/3839 
3115.pdf. 
 53. STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW—AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR 
HISTORY, RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE 179–93 (2011).  
 54. Id. 
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any opt-out feature. In such case, the opt-out possibility is more favorable 
for right holders because it allows them to restrict the exempted use.55 
The crucial question, however, is whether opt-out formalities can be 
employed to broaden the room for the introduction of limitations and 
exceptions under the three-step test. Does national legislation first have to 
ensure full compliance with the three-step test before it can add an opt-out 
formality? Or can the national legislature achieve compliance with the three-
step test by adding an opt-out possibility for right holders? Is national 
legislation free to introduce a use privilege that otherwise—without an opt-
out feature—would fail the test? Against the background of Article 10bis(1) 
BC, this latter view seems to be correct.56 Article 10bis(1) BC complies with 
the three-step test because it contains an opt-out formality. Nonetheless, 
further research seems necessary to verify the validity of this position. In 
particular, the rationales underlying the prohibition of formalities in Article 
5(2) BC must be taken into account. The provision seeks to afford authors 
the opportunity to obtain copyright protection in different states without 
being obliged to comply with various formalities.57 Thus, whatever opt-out 
system is invented in combination with copyright limitations and exceptions, 
it should not become too heavy a burden for right holders seeking protection 
in different national systems. 
C. USING FLEXIBILITY TOOLS TO PHASE OUT EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS 
When taken together, the package of all three flexibility tools—equitable 
remuneration, embargo periods, and opt-out formalities—might even allow 
the establishment of a new system of limitations and exceptions that offers 
policymakers the opportunity to phase out exclusive rights and replace them 
with remuneration rights.58 Through embargo periods, it could be ensured 
that such a phase-out system does not become operational before a work’s 
 
 55. See id. at 210–11. 
 56. See id. at 211 (agreeing that “it may well be that the possibility to ‘opt out’ eases 
compliance with the three-step test, as it mitigates some of the adverse effects of the 
proposed copyright exceptions.”). But see Alexander Peukert, A Bipolar Copyright System for the 
Digital Network Environment, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, at 60–69 (2005) (arguing 
that the opt-out model potentially clashes with Article 5(2) BC prohibition against 
formalities and poses further problems in compliance with the three-step test). 
 57. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 53, at 155–57. 
 58. For a more detailed discussion of the merits of a remuneration-based reward and 
incentive system, see Christophe Geiger, Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations: 
Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515, 531–
33 (2010). See also N. Suzor, Access, Progress, and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 
15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 297, at 322–29 (discussing the necessity to abandon traditional 
incentive and reward justifications for exclusive rights in copyright law and inquiring into 
appropriate reward schemes and alternate compensation models instead). 
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normal exploitation has been completed. The payment of equitable 
remuneration will be necessary in many cases to compensate right holders for 
the loss of the opportunity to prohibit and actively control the use of their 
works once the normal exploitation has come to an end. Finally, opt-out 
formalities could be used to prevent the phase-out system from causing 
disproportionate harm to right holders.59 As long as the work is actively 
promoted and commercialized, the right holder may have legitimate reasons 
to insist on the right to prohibit and control its use even after the normal 
exploitation. In this situation, an appropriate registration or notification 
system would allow right holders to maintain their exclusive rights. A system 
that allows policymakers to phase-out exclusive rights is capable of 
safeguarding a proper balance between copyright protection and areas of 
freedom that are necessary to satisfy competing social, cultural, and 
economic interests. From the perspective of utilitarian copyright theory, 
copyright is not only granted to reward authors for the time and effort spent 
on the creation of a new work.60 Rather, the lawmaker seeks to enhance 
benefits for society as a whole. The promise of exclusive rights allowing the 
commercialization of a work is offered to authors as an incentive to 
encourage their intellectual productivity.61 A marketable copyright is 
 
 59. As to previous proposals concerning the inclusion of opt-out or opt-in features in 
the system of copyright limitations and exceptions, see Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law 
on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 
1826–41 (2007); Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 39–
50 (2004); WILLIAM FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE 
OF ENTERTAINMENT 199–258 (2004).  
 60. As to this latter reward rationale in copyright law, see STEPHEN M. STEWART & 
HAMISH R SANDISON, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 3 
(1989); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287–88 (Cambridge University 
Press 1988); William Enfield, Observations on Literary Property (London 1774), reprinted in THE 
LITERARY PROPERTY DEBATE: EIGHT TRACTS, 1774–1775, at 21 (Stephen Parks ed., 1974). 
 61. In this vein, the U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, referred to copyright as an 
“engine of free expression” in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
But cf. Alain Strowel, Droit d’auteur and Copyright: Between History and Nature, in OF AUTHORS 
AND ORIGINS 235, 241–49 (B. Sherman & A. Strowel eds., 1994) (pointing out that this 
utilitarian view makes copyright a granted prerogative requiring exclusive rights to be 
positively enacted whereas natural law theory allows the assumption of comprehensive 
exclusive rights that do not deserve positive legal enactment); P.E. Geller, Must Copyright Be 
Forever Caught Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 159, 
164–66 (B. Sherman & A. Strowel eds., 1994) (describing copyright in the sense of utilitarian 
theory as a bait to encourage the intellectual productivity of authors); Steven P. Calandrillo, 
An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, 
Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 301, 310–26 (1998) (discussing possible 
alternative non-economic incentives that may encourage authors to produce works).  
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conferred to ensure a sufficient supply of disseminated knowledge and 
information.62 
Following this utilitarian line of argument, the grant of exclusive rights in 
copyright law must offer authors and the creative industries the possibility to 
recoup their investment in the creation and dissemination of protected 
works.63 However, the grant of rights need not be broader than that. The 
utilitarian approach merely justifies rights strong enough to induce the 
desired production of intellectual works.64 Limitations and exceptions, and 
thus the breathing space offered under the three-step test, play a crucial role 
in avoiding overbroad exclusive rights. Through the flexible application of 
the three-step test, national policymakers can ensure that exclusive rights do 
not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives underlying the 
copyright system.  
The flexible application of the three-step test is of particular importance 
when the term of copyright protection is too long and cultural follow-on 
innovation based on pre-existing works—the creative reuse and remix of 
protected material—is delayed or even frustrated.65 In such a situation, 
additional room to phase out exclusive rights with regard to certain forms of 
use is crucial to the maintenance of an efficient copyright system. Embargo 
periods and opt-out formalities provide this additional room. As the term of 
copyright protection in the United States and the European Union amounts 
 
 62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (containing the famous formula of promoting “the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). Utilitarian principles are 
also reflected in E.U. copyright legislation. For instance, Recital 4 of the Information Society 
Directive 2001/29/EC states that:  
A harmonised legal framework on copyright and related rights, through 
increased legal certainty and while providing for a high level of protection 
of intellectual property, will foster substantial investment in creativity and 
innovation, including network infrastructure, and lead in turn to growth 
and increased competitiveness of European industry, both in the area of 
content provision and information technology and more generally across 
a wide range of industrial and cultural sectors. This will safeguard 
employment and encourage new job creation. 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in 
the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167). 
 63. B.W.F. Depoorter, Intellectueel eigendomsrecht, in DE ECONOMISCHE ANALYSE VAN 
HET RECHT 209 (W.C.T. Weterings et al. eds., 2007).  
 64. Strowel, supra note 61, at 241–49; Calandrillo, supra note 61, at 310–12. 
 65. For a description of this corrosive effect on cultural follow-on innovation, see 
Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: the Law and Economic Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 
60–61 (2005). 
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to seventy years post mortem auctoris,66 it cannot be ruled out that the time is 
ripe to make use of this additional room under the international three-step 
test to prevent the copyright system that was designed to stimulate the 
creation and dissemination of new works, from frustrating both objectives 
instead. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Traditionally, the payment of equitable remuneration is seen as the 
primary tool to enhance flexibility for the introduction of copyright 
limitations and exceptions under the international three-step test. The 
present analysis has shown, however, that the use of embargo periods and 
opt-out formalities may also enhance the room available to national 
policymakers. In particular, these additional flexibility tools can help to 
overcome a potential conflict with a work’s normal exploitation. They are 
important supplements to the payment of equitable remuneration, which 
traditionally has been understood only to reduce an unreasonable prejudice 
to a permissible reasonable level. The combination of the payment of 
equitable remuneration with embargo periods and opt-out formalities may 
even pave the way for a new system of limitations and exceptions that offers 
policymakers the opportunity to phase out exclusive rights and replace them 
with remuneration rights. Once this new system is introduced to prevent the 
long term of copyright protection from becoming an obstacle to the 
productive remix and reuse of protected works, it could provide strong 
additional support for follow-on innovation in the cultural sector. 
 
 66. With regard to the situation in the European Union, see article 1(1) of the 
Copyright and Related Rights Term Directive 2006/116/EC. As to the extension of the 
term of copyright protection to seventy years after the author’s death in the United States, 
see Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 and Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 
(2003). The international minimum term of protection is fifty years after the author’s death. 
See Article 7(1) BC.  
